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 1 Introduction
In the literature of coalition formation it is standard to focus on stationary
coalitional strategies, i.e. strategies that depend only on the status quo,
and not on the history of how the status quo has been reached. This strate-
gic rigidity contributes to the various diﬃculties in determining a solution.
Indeed, as demonstrated by Barberà and Gerber (2007), there is no Pareto-
optimal, stable, farsighted, and self-consistent coalition formation solution
even in a restricted class of games when strategies are stationary.1 This
paper studies the scope of solutions that become feasible when more general
strategies allowed.
We develop model of stable and farsighted coalitional decision making
in the general framework by Chwe (1994). Our solution is based on the von
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets. To capture players’ farsighted-
ness, we follow Chwe (1994) and Harsanyi (1970), by using indirect dom-
inance as the dominance criterion.2 T h en o v e lf e a t u r eo ft h es o l u t i o ni s
that it explicitly takes into account dynamics by introducing histories, i.e.
sequences of status quos that have been visited before reaching the current
status quo, into the deﬁnition of feasible outcomes. A dynamic stable set is
simply a vNM stable set deﬁned over the set of histories. Hence, stability of
a status quo is conditioned on the history via which it is reached.
It is well known that a stable set may fail to exists with stationary strate-
g i e s ,e v e nw h e nd e ﬁned with respect to indirect dominance. In fact, Chwe
(1984) and Barberà and Gerber (2007) suggest that no solution concept can
satisfy internal stability in domination-rich environments. We show that
this premise is based on a narrow interpretation of the coalition formation
process.
Our main result is that there always exists a dynamic stable set that is
deﬁned with respect to the indirect dominance relation. A complete charac-
terization of the outcomes implementable via such dynamic stable sets are
characterized. We show that the unique maximal dynamic stable set can
be interpreted as the ultimate uncovered set that is deﬁn e dw i t hr e s p e c tt o
indirect dominance.3
However, it can be argued that indirect dominance does not adequately
capture agents’ farsightedness. As Xue (1998) discusses, indirect domi-
nance may reﬂect unreasonably optimistic expectations concerning the con-
sequences of the deviation. Nothing in the notion of indirect dominance pre-
vents the coalitions from deviating from the dominance path before reaching
1Barberà and Gerber (2007) focus on hedonic games.
2Outcome b indirectly dominates a if there is a sequence of outcomes starting from a
and ending to b that are paired with potentially active coalitions such that any coalition
prefers b over the outcome it is paired with.
3The uncovered set is due to Fishburn (1977), and Miller (1980). Iteration of the
uncovered set is studied e.g. by Dutta (1988), and Coughlan and LeBreton (1999).
1the ﬁnal outcome.
This questions also the validity of indirect dominance as the appropri-
ate primitive of the model. However, not in all cases is the criticism war-
ranted. This is true, in particular, when indirect dominance implies direct
d o m i n a n c e( t h ec o n v e r s ei st r u ea u t o m a t i c a l l y ) .I ft h eﬁnal element in any
indirect dominance chain could be reached in one step, then no concerns
would arise as to whether intermediate deviation from the path could take
place. Thus, if indirect and direct dominance coincide, then it justiﬁed to
argue that the dominance relation truly reﬂects farsightedness.
A particular scenario where the equivalence of direct and indirect dom-
inance automatically holds is endogenous agenda formation.T h e r u l e s o f
the agenda setting game are simple: An outcome herited from the history
is on the table. Then any coalition of at least k agents (e.g. a majority)
may challenge the outcome on the table by proposing (any) another out-
come. The new outcome then becomes the alternative on the table. When
the alternative on the table is not challenged, it is implemented.
We show that when k is at least one half of the population (i.e. a
majority), then the resulting set of implementable outcomes is a subset of
Pareto-optimal outcomes. The converse, however, is not true. With small
k, an o n - e ﬃcient outcome may become implemented.
Agenda formation has been an important topic in the literature. The
distinctive feature of our approach is the unboundedness of the agenda for-
mation process. Most of the literature assume a ﬁxed, ﬁnitely long agenda.
E.g. Moulin (1979), Shepsle and Weingast, (1984), and Banks (1985) analyse
majority voting in ﬁnite elimination trees. Dutta, Jackson and Le Bre-
ton (2001a, see also 2001b, 2002) study endogenous agenda formation with
bounded maximum length of the resulting agenda. With unbounded agenda
formation process, backwards induction cannot be used to solve the model.4
It needs to be identiﬁed via internal consistency considerations.
2 Dynamic stability
The game is deﬁned by a list Γ = hN,A,(ºi)i∈N,(→S)S⊆Ni,w h e r eN is
the set of players, A is the nonempty and ﬁnite set of outcomes, ºi is the
preference relation of player i ∈ N with the the asymmetric part Âi . Denote
a ÂS b if a Âi b for all i ∈ S ⊆ N. A binary relation →S on A represents
what a coalition S can do: a →S b means that S is allowed to replace the
status quo outcome a with a new status quo b. Collection (→S)S∈2N is part
of the basic data of the game and not subject to actions of the players.
The game is interpreted as follows: There is an initial status quo outcome
a0. At any stage t =0 ,1,...,alternative at is the status quo. If the members
of coalition S decide to change the status quo at to b, and at →S b, then
4For recent contributions towards this direction, see Penn (2005a,b).
2b becomes the new status quo in stage t +1 . If no coalition S such that
at →S b wants to induce b as the new status quo, then at is implemented
and payoﬀsm a t e r i a l i z e .
Players only care about the implemented outcome. The status quo out-
come is always public information.
The model allows many interpretations. For applications that go under
the umbrella of this framework, see Chwe (1994) or Xue (1998).
We say that b dominates a, and write b>a ,if there is a coalition S such
that a →S b and b ÂS a. However, farsighted players should anticipate fur-
ther deviations along the deviation path, and care only of the ﬁnal outcome
(see Harsaynyi, 1974). To capture farsightedness, we extend the notion of
dominance as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Indirect Dominance) Outcome b indirectly dominates a,
written as b À a, if there are outcomes a = b0,...,b m = b and coalitions
S0,...,S m−1 such that bk →Sk bk+1 and b ÂSk bk, for all k =0 ,...,m− 1.
A successive coalitional actions induce a history a0,a 1,...of non-implemented
status quos. Denote by H the set of all possible ﬁnite histories (a0,...,a k)
such that al−1 →S al, for some S ∈ 2N, for all l =1 ,...,k.
Deﬁnition 2 (Dynamic stability) A dynamic stable set V ⊂ H is de-
ﬁned by:
1. (External dynamic stability) If (h,a) 6∈ V, then there is (h,a,...,b) ∈ V
such that b À a.
2. (Internal dynamic stability) If (h,a) ∈ V, then there is no (h,a,...,b) ∈
V such that b À a.
Dynamic stable set is free of inner contradictions and accounts for every
history is excludes. That is, no element in the set is indirectly dominated
by an element in the set and every element outside the set is indirectly
dominated by an element in the set.
The ﬁnal outcome a in a history (h,a) in a dynamic stable set V is in-
terpreted to become implemented once the history is reached as no coalition
wants to challenge it given that the play eventually converges to back to V.
Set Y o fo u t c o m e si ss a i dt ob eimplementable with the dynamic stable set
V if
Y = {a :( h,a) ∈ V,h ∈ H}.
The set of implementable outcomes is our main object of our study. The
initial status quo may aﬀect the eventual outcome that will become im-
plemented in the maximal set of implementable outcomes but not the set
itself.
3The concept of stable set aims at capturing in reduced form some as-
pects of sequential rationality in dynamic coalition formation. Consider any
history (h,a) in the set of implementable outcomes of a dynamic stable
set (referred henceforth as a "stable outcome"). Suppose that a coalition
replaces a with b.S i n c e (h,a) is stable, by external stability, the history
(h,a,b) is indirectly dominated by a stable (h,a,b,...,c). However, by inter-
nal stability, (h,a,b,...,c) cannot indirectly dominate (h,a) which can only
mean that c is not preferred to a by all players in the original, deviating
coalition. Hence, assuming that a deviation will be followed by further dy-
namics along some indirect dominance path until an element in the stable
set is reached, no coalition of agents can agree on challenging a stable status
quo.
As is customary in much of the coalition literature, the details of the
coalition formation process are out left from the model. In particular, we
do not assume anything on how a coalition is grouped, why some coalition
and not another is formed, and how a coalition chooses to which alternative
it will move the game.5 The outlook of the stable set may be sensitive to
details. However, the existence, which we shall establish, is not.
2.1 Characterization
Denote the set of outcomes that indirectly dominate a by
D(a)={b ∈ A : b À a}.
Deﬁnition 3 (Consistent choice set) A nonempty set X ⊆ A is a con-
sistent choice set if, for any a ∈ X, b ∈ D(a) implies that there is c ∈ X
such that c ∈ D(b) \ D(a).
That is, if an element in a consistent choice set X is indirectly dominated
by an (any) alternative, then this alternative is itself indirectly dominated
by another alternative in X that does not indirectly dominate the original
element in X. A consistent choice set meeting Deﬁnition 3 is related to the
consistent set deﬁned by Chwe (1994). The relation between the two notions
is discussed in Section 4.
Now we establish that any stable set (would such exist) is outcome equiv-
alent to a consistent choice set.
Lemma 4 V is a dynamic stable set only if {a :( h,a) ∈ V, h ∈ H} is a
consistent choice set.
5However, equibrium coalition formation process of a non-cooperative model can usu-
ally be captured in a reduced form via a stable set that is deﬁn e dw i t hr e s p e c tt oa p p r o -
priately deﬁned dominance relation, see e.g. Diamantoudi and Xue (2006).
4Proof. Let V be a stable set. We show that {a0 :( h0,a 0) ∈ V, h0 ∈ H} meets
Deﬁnition 3. Take a ∈ {a0 :( h0,a 0) ∈ V,h0 ∈ H}. Identify h ∈ H such that
(h,a) ∈ V. Suppose that there is (h,a,...,b) such that b À a. By internal
stability, (h,a,...,b) 6∈ V. By external stability, there is (h,a,...,b,...,c) ∈ V
such that c À b. Thus c ∈ {a0 :( h0,a 0) ∈ V, h0 ∈ H}. By internal stability,
however, not c À a, as desired.
Now we show the converse, that for any consistent choice set there exists
a stable set that is outcome equivalent to the consistent choice set. For this
purpose, we construct a stable set.
Denote the complement of D(a) by
L(a)={b ∈ A : not b À a}. (1)
Fix a consistent choice set X.L e t
Q = {qa : a ∈ X}, (2)
be a partition of H, constructed recursively as follows: Let a0 ∈ qa0. For any
(a0,...,a k) ∈ H, if (a0,...,a k) ∈ qa, then
(a0,...,a k,b) ∈
½
qb, if b ∈ L(a) ∩ X,
qa, if b 6∈ L(a) ∩ X.
(3)
Proceeding this way for all b ∈ A, and for all k =0 ,1,..., each history
(a0,...,a k,b) in H is allocated into one element of Q.
Note that the transition rule (3) can be described directly via a transition
function τ such that
τ(qa,b)=
½
qb, if b ∈ L(a) ∩ X,
qa, if b 6∈ L(a) ∩ X.
(4)
That is, whenever the play is in state q and the status quo is b, the new
state will be τ(q,b). We will use this speciﬁcation in the proof below.
We let the agents to implement a the status quo b in state qa if b is
contained in L(a) ∩ X. The procedure V X corresponding to this idea is
deﬁned by
V X = {(qa,b):b ∈ L(a) ∩ X, a ∈ X}.
By construction,
©
b :( qa,b) ∈ V Xª
= {b : b ∈ L(a) ∩ X, for some a ∈ X}
= {b : b ∈ {b} ∩ X}
= X. (5)
Thus, elements in the consistent choice set X are implementable with the
procedure V X. We next show that V X is a stable set.6
6With the notational simpliﬁcation that (h,b) ∈ V




5Lemma 5 V X is a dynamic stable set.
Proof. External stability:T a k ea n y(qa,b) such that b 6∈ X ∩ L(a). If b 6∈
L(a), then X∩L(a)\L(b) is nonempty by the deﬁnition of X. If b ∈ L(a)\X,
then a ∈ X ∩L(a) \L(b). Thus there is c such that c ∈ X ∩L(a) \L(b). By
the construction of V X, (qa,c) ∈ V X.
Internal stability:T a k ea n y(qa,b) such that b ∈ X∩L(a). Then (qa,b) ∈
V X. Take any (qd,c) ∈ V X (i.e. c ∈ L(d) ∩ X). Suppose that c indi-
rectly dominates b via sequences b0,...,b m ∈ A and q0,...,q m ∈ Q such that
τ(ak,q k)=qk+1 and bm ÂSk bk for all k =0 ,...,m−1, and such that c = bm
and b = b0.
By the construction of τ, q0 6= q1.L e tk ≤ m − 1 be the highest integer
such that qk 6= qd. Since there is no transition away from state qd after k, it
must be, by the construction of τ, that bk = d. Thus c ∈ L(d) ∩ X implies
bm ∈ L(bk) ∩ X. Since bm does not indirectly dominate bk it follows that
bm does not indirectly dominate b0 via sequences b0,...,b k,...,b m ∈ A and
q0,...,q m ∈ Q, a contradiction to the supposition.
By Lemma 4, a set Y of alternatives is implementable via a dynamic
stable set only if Y is a consistent choice set. Conversely, by (5) and Lemma
5, outcomes of any consistent choice can be implemented via a stable set.
We compound these observations in the following characterization.
Theorem 6 Set Y of alternatives is implementable in a dynamic stable set
if and only if Y is a consistent choice set.
this result does not, however, tell nothing about the existence of a con-
sistent choice set nor how it can be identiﬁed. The next section proves the
existence, and provides an algorithm for identifying the maximal consistent
choice set.
2.2 Farsightedly uncovered set
Given B ⊆ A, we say that a À −covers b in B if (i) a,b ∈ B, (ii) a À b,
and (iii) c ∈ B and c À a implies c À b. More compactly, a À −covers b in
B if {a} ∪ D(a) ∩ B ⊆ D(b) ∩ B.
By the deﬁnition of indirect dominance, an alternative cannot indirectly
dominate itself, i.e. a 6∈ D(a). However, if {a} ∪ D(a) ∩ B ⊆ D(b) ∩ B and
{b} ∪ D(b) ∩ B ⊆ D(a) ∩ B, then a ∈ D(a).T h u si fa À −covers b in B,
then b does not À −cover a in B.
Lemma 7 The À −covering relation in B is asymmetric, for any B ⊆ A.
Moreover, {a} ∪ D(a) ∩ B ⊆ D(b) ∩ B and {b} ∪ D(b) ∩ B ⊆ D(c) ∩ B
imply {a}∪D(a)∩B ⊆ D(c)∩B. Thus a À −covers b in B, and b À −covers
c in B, then a À −covers c in B.
6Lemma 8 The À −covering relation in B is transitive, for any B ⊆ A.
Denote by UC(B) the À −uncovered set of B, i.e. the set of alternatives
not À −covered in B by any element in B (cf. Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1980).
Since any transitive and asymmetric relation on a ﬁnite set has a maximal
element, the À −uncovered set is nonempty for any nonempty B.
Lemma 9 UC(B) is nonempty if B is nonempty, for any B ⊆ A.
We now strengthen of the À −uncovered set -concept. The ultimate
À −uncovered set (cf. Miller, 1980; Dutta, 1988; Laslier, 1998) is deﬁned
recursively as follows. Set UC0 = A, and let UCk+1 = UC(UCk), for all
k =0 ,....T h e nUC∞ is the ultimate À −uncovered set. By Lemma 9, UCk
is nonempty for all k which implies that UC∞ is nonempty.
Let UC∞ = Z. By construction, no element in Z is À −covered in Z.
Since A is nonempty and ﬁnite, we have, by Lemma 9, the following.
Lemma 10 Z is nonempty.
The aim of this subsection is to prove that a consistent choice set and,
by Theorem 6, a stable set exists. We now show that the ultimate uncovered
set is a consistent choice set.
Theorem 11 Z is a consistent choice set.
Proof. Z is nonempty by Lemma 10. Take a ∈ Z and let b À a. We ﬁnd
an element in Z that indirectly dominates b but not a.
Since A is a ﬁnite set, there is a ﬁnite m such that Z = UCm. Choose
b = c0 and, for all j =0 ,..., ﬁnd kj such that cj+1 À −covers cj in UCkj
and cj ∈ UCkj \UCkj+1. Let j∗ ≤ m be the maximum number of such steps








7Since {c1} ∪ D(c1) ∩ UCk0 ⊆ D(c0) ∩ UCk0, and since UCk1 ⊆ UCk0, it
follows that {c1}∪D(c1)∩UCk1 ⊆ D(c0)∩UCk1. As the same relation holds
for c1 and c2, we have, by chaining the relations, that {c2}∪D(c2)∩UCk2 ⊆
D(c0)∩UCk2 (depicted in Figure 1). By induction on 0,...,j∗, it follows that
{cj∗} ∪ D(cj∗) ∩ Z ⊆ D(c0) ∩ Z. Thus cj∗ ∈ D(c0).
Choose cj∗ = c (and recall that c0 = b). Then c ∈ D(b) and c ∈ Z.
Since b ∈ D(a) and c ∈ D(b), we are done if c 6∈ D(a). Suppose, to the
contrary, that c ∈ D(a).S i n c e a,c ∈ Z,a n dUC∞ = Z, it follows that
{c} ∪ D(c) ∩ Z 6⊆ D(a) ∩ Z. Thus, since c ∈ D(a),t h e r ei sd ∈ Z such that
d ∈ D(c) \ D(a). Since {c} ∪ D(c) ⊆ D(b), and d ∈ D(c),w eh a v et h a t







The next result shows that Z is the (unique) maximal consistent choice
set in the sense of set inclusion, given the asymmetric binary relation À .
Theorem 12 Z is the maximal consistent choice set.
Proof. Let X be a consistent choice set. We show that X ⊆ Z. Recall
Deﬁnition 3: if a ∈ X and b ∈ D(a), then X ∩ D(b) \ D(a) is nonempty.
Equivalently,
{a} ∪ D(a) ∩ X 6⊆ D(b) ∩ X, for all a ∈ X, for all b ∈ A. (6)
By (6), {a} ∪ D(a) 6⊆ D(b), for all a ∈ X. Thus, by the deﬁnition of
covering in A, X ⊆ UC(A). Thus, by (6), {a} ∪ D(a) ∩ UC(A) 6⊆ D(b) ∩
8UC(A) for all a ∈ X. Thus, by the deﬁnition of covering in UC(A), X ⊆
UC(UC(A)) = UC2. By induction, X ⊆ UC∞ = Z.
B yL e m m a5a n dT h e o r e m1 1 ,V Z is a stable set. Moreover, by Theorem
11, the outcomes induced by V Z are the maximal set of outcomes induced
by any dynamic stable set.
Corollary 13 V Z is a stable set. Moreover, Z i st h eu n i q u em a x i m a ls e t
of outcomes that can be implemented in any dynamic stable set.
Thus it is without loss of generality to focus on Z if one is interested
interested on the welfare consequences of dynamically stable coalitional bar-
gaining with farsighted agents.
3 Discussion
3.1 Relation to the largest consistent set
A consistent choice set meeting Deﬁnition 3 is more restrictive than Chwe’s
(1994) consistent set, deﬁned as follows: A set Z ⊆ A is consistent if a ∈ Z
and a →S b, then there is c ∈ Z such that c = b or c ∈ D(a) and c 6ÂS a.
Thus there are two weakenings relative to the deﬁnition of consistent
choice set: (i) Chwe’s consistent set only concerns the case where b directly
dominates a. (ii) It requires that if b dominates a via S ⊆ A, then it is only
S that does not beneﬁtf r o mc relative to a. A consistent choice set meeting
Deﬁnition 3 makes both parts more stringent by requiring the condition to
hold for all b that indirectly (and, hence, directly) dominate a, and that
there is no S for which it holds. As a consequence, a consistent choice set
meeting Deﬁnition 3 is consistent in the sense of Chwe, but not vice versa.
Since the maximal consistent choice set, i.e. the ultimate uncovered set,
is a consistent choice set in the sense of Chwe, his largest consistent set,
which is the key solution of Chwe (1994), contains the ultimate uncovered
set, deﬁned with respect to the indirect dominance relation, as a subset (see
9Figure 3).
Largest 




3.2 Robustness of the model
As pointed out Xue (1998), farsighted dominance is not an unproblematic
concept when it comes to capturing foresight of the agents. Namely, there
is no guarantee that a deviating coalition in the middle of the deviation
path ﬁnds it "optimal" to adhere to the expected action. It is not clear
why the coalition would not choose another deviation, especially if this is in
the end expected to bring all its members a higher payoﬀ than the original
one. Because of the implicit optimism embedded into the notion of indirect
dominance, the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994) may be too inclusive.
This criticism is also valid also in the context of dynamic stable set. For
if an active coalition cannot be sure that the projected outcome is eventually
reached, it may not be in all the coalition members’ interest to participate
the coalition. But then an element outside the stable set need no longer be
destabilized, invalidating the indirect dominance argument. Furthermore, if
an element outside the stable set fails to be unstable, if an element outside
the stable set is rendered stable, then there is no guarantee that no coalition
will not challenge an outcome inside the stable set by demanding this newly
stabilized outcome. Hence also internal stability may become invalidated..
However, in some scenarios the scepticism towards indirect dominance is
not warranted. Optimism may not be needed to guarantee that the end of
the deviation chain is reached. This is particularly true when indirect dom-
inance implies direct dominance (the converse holds by deﬁnition). Then,
by the deﬁnition of direct dominance, the ﬁrst deviating coalition can reach
the ﬁnal element in the deviation path in a single step. Thus there is no
need to worry about the credibility of the interim deviations. Moreover,
since the dynamic stable set is deﬁned with respect to indirect dominance,
it is still true that any outcome outside the stable set is directly dominated
10by an outcome in the set. Thus a deviation from the stable set leads back,
in one step, to the stable set. By the deﬁnition of indirect dominance, the
latter outcome is not preferred by all the members of the originally deviat-
ing coalition and hence the Harsnyi-critique is avoided. Both internal and
external stability should hold without reservations.
While asking indirect dominance to coincide with direct dominance is
a strong requirement, it holds in a natural class of coalitional games. We
apply the dynamic stable set -solution to an unbounded agenda formation
-problem, where a subsets of agents (with certain cardinality) are allowed
to challenge the status quo with any alternative.
4 Unbounded agenda formation
Agenda setting has been viewed as a major problem in voting theory. Moulin
(1979), Shepsle and Weingast, (1984), and Banks (1985) analyse majority
voting within a ﬁnite agenda, i.e. binary tree. From these studies it is
clear that the agenda setter can inﬂuence the implemented outcome. Dutta,
Jackson and Le Breton (2001a, see also 2001b, 2002) study endogenous
agenda formation under the hypothesis that the length of an agenda is ﬁnite.
We, on the contrary, allow unbounded formation of the agenda.
Let agents N = {1,...,n} engage in the process of making a a decision
over the set A of alternatives. For any k ∈ {1,...,n}, the agenda setting
game for the k−majority rule where, if a ∈ A is the status quo, then the
coalition S can induce b as the status quo if the size of S is at least k, i.e.,
for any a ∈ A, a →S b for any b ∈ A if |S| >k . The intuition is that if the
status quo a is not challenged by any coalition, then it is implemented.
Let the irreﬂexive binary relation Mk denote the k−majority dominance
over pairs of A, i.e. aMkb if and only if there is a coalition S with at
least k members such that a ÂS b. Since in this set up, →S applies to all
pairs in A×A whenever S contains at least k members, indirect dominance
equals direct dominance. Denote by Dk(a) the outcomes that (directly or
indirectly) Mk−dominate a.
By Theorem 12, the ultimate uncovered set deﬁned with respect to
Mk−relation completely characterizes the implementable outcomes. If k =
(n +1 ) /2, and n is odd, then the Mk-relation is a tournament, the case
studied e.g. by Dutta (1988). The ultimate uncovered set is his covering
set.7 Hence the largest dynamic stable set of commitment free agenda set-
ting procedure with majority voting gives an interpretation to the covering
set, called for by Dutta (1988).
The following result demonstrates that the outcomes that are imple-
mentable via the agenda setting game are always Pareto-optimal if only
7In fact, any consistent choice set is a covering set, see Vartiainen (2006).
11coalitions consisting a majority can upset the status quo. Hence the "commitment-
free" agenda setting leads to eﬃciency, as suggested by the string version of
the Coase theorem, if one does not allow too much "diversity of opinions"
in the agenda formation.
Proposition 14 If k ≥ n/2, then all outcomes that are implementable in
a dynamic stable set V of the agenda setting game for the k−majority rule
are Pareto-optimal.
Proof. By Lemma 4, {a0 :( h,a0) ∈ V } is a consistent choice set. Suppose
that b ºN a for some a ∈ {a0 :( h,a0) ∈ V }. Then bMka. By Deﬁnition 3,
there is c such that c ∈ Dk(b) \ Dk(a). Take any S such that c ÂS b and
|S| ≥ k. By the transitivity of ºi’s, {j : c Âj a} ⊇ S ∩ N. But then, since
k ≥ 2/n, c ∈ Dk(b) implies c ∈ Dk(a), a contradiction.
However, when also coalitions smaller than the majority are allowed to
challenge the status quo, Pareto-optimality need not prevail. To see this,
choose n =3and k =1 , and let the agents’ preferences over {a,b,c} be
1:a Â b Â c,
2:a Â c Â b,
3:c Â a Â b.
Then no outcome is M1−covered. Thus also b, which is Pareto-dominated
by a, belongs to the (ultimate) uncovered set and, hence, is implementable
in a dynamic stable set.
We conclude that unless the agenda control is given to a majority, there
is no guarantee that the outcome will be Pareto-optimal. Hence, the strong
version of the Coase theorem fails.
5C o n c l u s i o n
One of the key problems with the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set so-
lution has been the existence problem in general contexts: In a domination-
rich environment the solution tends not to exists (see e.g. Shubik, 1997).
Another problem is that the solution - when it exists - is not easily com-
putable. For these reasons and others, many less demanding solutions have
been developed (see e.g. Rubinstein, 1980; Dutta, 1988; and Moulin, 1986.
Greenberg’s, 1990, oﬀers a general approach).
We argue that the existence problem stems from an implicit stationarity
assumption: Coalitional strategies are dependent only on the status quo
outcome. We show that if history dependent strategies are allowed, and
agents are farsighted, then a (dynamic) stable set always exists. Moreover,
we establish an algorithm that produces the (unique) maximal stable set.
12The algorithm is a version of the iterative procedure that identiﬁes the
ultimate uncovered set in the standard social choice setting.
The biggest problem with our suggested solution is not related to the
dynamicity but rather the way farsightedness is modeled. While the indirect
dominance -relation is commonly used in the literature (see e.g. Harsanyi,
1974; Chwe, 1994; Diamantoudi and Xue, 2005, 2006; Xue, 1998; Page et al.,
2005), it suﬀers from incredibility: It assumes that the agents conform with
a presupposed deviation path without considering their strategic options in
the middle of the path (see Xue, 1998, for analysis).
However, in the particular case when the a permissible coalition can al-
ways induce any outcome, i.e. indirect dominance implies direct dominance,
our solution is free from these considerations. The unbounded agenda for-
mation -game falls into this category. In this game coalitions of at least
certain size are allowed to challenge the outcome on the table without a
unboundedly many times.
We show that when the coalitions are required to form a majority, all
the implementable outcomes are Pareto-optimal. However, with smaller
coalition sizes, also ineﬃcient outcomes may become implemented. Since
the underlying process can be interpreted to reﬂect genuine non-commitment
from the party of the coalitions, this suggests that the Coase theorem is valid
even under nonstationary strategies (cf. Gomez and Jehiel, 2005; Konishi
and Ray, 2003) too much "diversity" is not permitted in valid coalition
formations
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